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The topics of disagreement and interest in the areas like judgments of taste 
and beliefs about future contingent have been around on the analytic scene 
for at least two decades. A dozen years ago Lasersohn has proposed an 
interesting and pioneering relativist semantics, primarily for judgments 
of personal taste, but extendable to a much wider domain (see Lasersohn 
2005). His views have been amply discussed, by authors like Michael Glan-
zberg (2007), John MacFarlane (2014), Herman Cappelen and John Haw-
thorne (2009), Tamina C. Stephenson (2007) and others; he addresses their 
concerns in the present book. Here, he slightly reformulates his earlier 
proposal, formulates the new one in much greater detail, extends it to a 
wider range of phenomena, and places it in the context of linguistic and 
philosophical discussion at the present moment. Here we shall concentrate 
on philosophically central issues, leaving, with apologies, all the technical 
linguistic details aside, except for saying that author’s treatment of them 
looks very impressive. We shall look at several issues: the semantics and 
pragmatics of predicates of personal taste, at the semantics/pragmatics 
distinction as seen by the author, and at aesthetic predicates, so that we 
shall not strictly follow the order of the book itself.
The “Introduction” offers motivation for the whole work, and an impor-
tant characterization of faultless disagreement. It starts from the standard 
speech situation between two characters. We regard them as disagree-
ing with one another, Lasersohn notes. And then comes the crucial point, 
namely that the absence of error makes disagreement “faultless”:
Yet neither one of them seems to be making an error of fact. We may regard each 
of them as entitled to his or her own opinion—as fully justifi ed in adopting and 
asserting that opinion—even though this places them in direct contradiction to 
one another. (7)
This is valid for a wider class of sentences and their uses: “(...) a sentence 
expresses a matter of opinion if it is declarative in syntactic form, but gives 
rise to faultless disagreement when contradicted” (7). This variation in 
truth is not dependent the possible-world parameter, but on the nature 
of values represented by value indices, so that the content is not true or 
false tout court, “but only relative to particular values for these non-world 
indices” (8). So, beside the monadic truth, we get parametrized notion of 
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“truth-relative-to-indices”, some of which are our value or opinion indices.
In the fi rst chapter, “Subjectivity, disagreement, and content” Laser-
sohn specifi es as his goal offering “a truth-theoretic semantics for sentences 
expressing subjective judgment (p. 1). The second chapter, “Dismissing the 
easy alternatives” is dedicated to popular alternatives such as Indexical 
and quantifi cational analyses and expressivism. The third chapter, “Set-
ting the syntactic and semantic stage” presents syntactic assumptions, and 
discusses classical topics, including pronouns, names, and anaphora. The 
fourth chapter is dedicated to the grammar of time and space. We reach 
the central philosophical issues in chapter fi ve, “Basic relativist semantics”.
Lasersohn’s relativism is quite radical (as has been noted by Dan López 
de Sa some years ago in his (2011)). Lasersohn has already in his (2005) 
paper introduced the now context parameter, the “judge parameter”; here is 
the way he describes it in the present work: 
Contextual parameters other than the judge were assumed to be fi xed by mat-
ters of fact, of course; so the connection between the context and matters of fact 
about the practical environment was not entirely severed. Sentences that were 
purely about matters of fact could be distinguished from sentences about matters 
of taste in that their contents did not vary in truth value among contexts which 
differed only in the value of the judge parameter. (92).
Now, Lasersohn wants to “articulate each formal context” into two parts, 
corresponding to the situation in which an expression is used, and the situ-
ation in which a truth value is “judged” (93). And, most importantly, “in 
sentences about matter of taste, the truth value may vary with both parts” 
(93). Here are then the innovations:
The primary changes to be made are:
(1) denotations will be assigned relative not just to a possible world index, but to 
a world index and a “perspective” index, where each perspective index itself is 
identifi ed with an ordered triple of an individual, a time, and a world;
(2) contents accordingly will be identifi ed not with functions mapping worlds onto 
denotations, but with functions mapping world-perspective pairs (or equivalent-
ly, world–individual–time–world quadruples) onto denotations;
(3) contexts of assessment will be distinguished from contexts of use, and will 
supply perspectives to serve as arguments to contents in order to derive denota-
tions, including truth values. (94)
I skip important, but less philosophical material in chapters on attitude pred-
icates and on assertion and pass directly to the characterization of disagree-
ment. Indeed, chapter nine, on “Pragmatics of truth assessment”, brings es-
sential material on faultless disagreement, where two people assert or believe 
contents which contradict each other, “without either one making an error of 
fact” (209). Lasersohn notes that this kind of disagreement
does not imply that neither party sees anything wrong at all with the beliefs or 
assertions of the other. One may regard another person’s beliefs or assertions as 
objectionable—and even mistaken—in all sorts of ways which do not involve er-
rors of fact. (209)
I fi nd the formulation puzzling, to say the least: if John sees Mary’s 
assertion as mistaken, how can he prevent himself from seeing that 
there is something wrong with it? Lasersohn probably meant “factually 
mistaken”, but he doesn’t say it. Errors of taste are not factual errors:
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What is an error of taste? Crucially, this is dependent on perspective: If I believe 
that roller coasters are fun, and you believe they are not fun, then from my per-
spective you are making an error of taste, and from your perspective I am making 
an error of taste. Objectively, there can be no answer, because the error is of taste 
and not of fact. (210)
Now, the point of introducing the apparatus was to understand the point 
of faultless disagreement in judgments of personal taste. How can we char-
acterize the point? It is interesting that the crucial story is placed within 
pragmatics. The initial characterization Lasersohn offers is cognitive: 
two parties will normally engage in a dispute about a matter of taste only if each 
of them regards the other as making an error of taste. This in no way represents 
a retreat from the idea that disagreements over matters of taste are faultless in 
our original sense, but is simply a clarifi cation of what kind of fault was envis-
aged. (210)
If we disagree about roller coasters being fun, “then from my perspective 
you are making an error of taste” and vice versa. Surprisingly, Lasersohn 
then introduce another explanation, a sociological or socio-psychological 
one. People debate and quarrel for the sake of practical advantage. If I like 
roller coasters, I wish that more of them be built, and I praise them hoping 
we, the roller coaster fans will prevail. The point is practical advantage 
(211).
This goes ill with the beginning of the account, which is clearly cogni-
tive. So, here I beg to disagree. I fi nd the whole idea of faultless disagree-
ment dubious. Consider the options in relation to a statement of taste, of 
the form A is Φ. The 1st order options are simple. We can have naive non-
dogmatist experiencer who simply claims that A is Φ and that’s it. On meta-
level, such an experiencer is simply agnostic about further matters: is A Φ 
for other people, who is right about it, and so on. One alternative, a bit more 
refl ective stance is the dogmatist one: If you don’t agree, you just don’t know 
about A being Φ. I think people who do sincerely debate the issues are hon-
est dogmatists, who naively believe they are objectively right. The other op-
tion is the tolerant, liberal one: “A is Φ; for me, I mean. How do you fi nd it?” 
On the meta-level, dogmatic disagreement goes well with value-absolutism, 
entailing that one of the parties is simply wrong, and with relativism. If one 
is not dogmatist about taste predicates, one should accept that dogmatist is 
simply wrong; no faultlessness is present. The liberal stance goes well with 
contextualism. If one is liberal, there is no deep disagreement. So, the idea 
of faultless disagreement is a myth. In this case, liberalism is wiser than 
dogmatism.
But note that language is open to all possibilities. The language of taste 
attitudes is compatible with all three fi rst-order stances: with naive non-
dogmatism, with dogmatism and with tolerant liberalism. Particular uses 
of language can be classifi ed along second-order options, as agnostic, abso-
lutistic, relativistic and contextualist. But the whole business is linguisti-
cally correct, syntactically, semantically and pragmatically, so I am doubt-
ful that there is a single correct reading of the use of taste predicates and 
the like. Our agnostic is linguistically in the clear. The absolutist does not 
reform language, she is into postulating objective value-properties in the 
world.  The relativist is not making a linguistic mistake, and here Laser-
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sohn has to agree. Finally, the contextualist is in clear, as far as language 
alone is concerned; her description fi ts the liberal usage perfectly, she may 
only have problems in theoretical accounting for other options, but not with 
mischaracterizing language as used by the tolerant liberal.
Let me just mention an issue that raises its head in the same chapter. 
What is the relation between semantics and pragmatics according to La-
sersohn? Pragmatic theory, he claims, explains how contexts of assessment 
provide particular values for their parameters, and how people go about 
assessing the truth values of each other’s assertions (134). Others would 
claim that this is done by meta-semantics; If it is so, what job is left to prag-
matics? I must say that I am not in clear about the criteria; I am even not 
certain that there is a clear division in the literature. It would have been 
helpful if Lasersohn were a bit more explicit about his choices.
Chapter Ten, “Between fact and opinion” is philosophically among the 
most interesting parts of the book. The central idea is “that certain perspec-
tives may be ranked as objectively better than others” and that there is a 
theoretical possibility that “certain sentence contents vary in truth value 
from perspective to perspective, yet also have ‘objective’ truth values with 
no relativization” (214). That would point to “a middle ground, between fully 
subjective matters of opinion, and fully objective matters of fact” (214). I fi nd 
this particularly interesting because the issue arises in the context of de-
bates about response-dependence, and can be traced back at least to Hume: 
there is a variation in standards of aesthetic taste, but at the same time we 
tend to see certain sets of standards as more refi ned and in fact better, than 
others. After discussing aesthetic judgment and refi nement of taste the au-
thor passes to other candidates, for instance claims about future contingent 
events where later perspectives seem better than the earlier ones, so that 
there is again a possibility of hierarchy. Next come epistemic modals: here, 
“some perspectives seem inherently better than others for evaluating the 
truth of such contents. We may therefore assign such contents ‘absolute’ 
truth values in addition to relativized truth values, despite the perspectival 
variation” (224). He concludes with a fi ne analysis of seemingly unrelated 
phenomena, scalar cut-offs too, and derogatory epithets, and fi nds interest-
ing analogy in the possibility of hierarchies of perspectives.
The last and concluding chapter offers an evolutionary fable about pos-
sible sources of perspective assessment, and a formalization of perspective 
relations in an abstract cognitive space (which reminds one of Gärdenfors 
and his conceptual spaces).
Let me conclude. The book offers an impressive combination of linguis-
tic and philosophical refl ection, enriched by impressive technical logico-lin-
guistic skills. It gives a very wide account of the behavior and meaning of 
centrally important predicates in natural languages, the ones that some-
how point to a reference to the speaker or the judge of the sentence in which 
they occur. I disagree with the main motivation, namely belief in faultless 
disagreement, but I fi nd the defense rich and impressive. Lasersohn’s sys-
tematization of various important predicate kinds is very helpful. I agree 
that some response-dependent properties allow for objective standards and 
I hope the moral properties are such; it would be nice if aesthetic properties 
were. Again, I agree that some predicates and properties don’t allow, for 
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Bradley Murray, The Possibility of Culture: Pleasure 
and Moral Development in Kant’s Aesthetics, Oxford: 
Wiley Blackwell, 2015, 160 pp.
To put it simply, everyone interested in Kant’s philosophy and/or in the way 
art and nature connect to our morality and our culture, should read Bradley 
Murray’s book. Reader-friendly and easily accessible even to those who have 
not spent their lives studying the philosophical giant that is Kant, Murray’s 
book offers an intriguing insight into some of the often-neglected aspects 
of Kant’s aesthetics. Beginning with the simple question, why is it ok for 
us to pursue aesthetic pleasures provided by art and nature, Murray not 
only manages to explain the relevance of aesthetic pleasure for our personal 
development and social wellbeing, but he does so by situating Kant’s theory 
of beauty against a wider background of Kant’s works, primarily his anthro-
pology and moral psychology. While most of those who work on Kant’s third 
Critique tend to either analyze it in connection to the fi rst or the second 
Critique (i.e. either to Kant epistemology or to Kant’s ethics), Murray man-
ages to offer a new look at the third Critique by situating it against Kant’s 
accounts of emotions, passions and culture, as developed in his Lectures on 
Anthropology, Metaphysics of Morals, Toward Perpetual Peace and his other 
works of more empirical bent. A result is an intelligible, clear, precise and 
above all informative book which motivates one to take up Kant and see his 
instance, the taste predicates. But the very bringing together of a very wide 
range of domains from aesthetic, through moral all the way to epistemic 
modals, and future contingent matters, and offering a way to systematize 
the phenomena appearing in these domains, is an impressive achievement.
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